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THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: GUIDING THE
DETERMINATION OF GOOD CAUSE TO DEPART FROM
THE STATUTORY PLACEMENT PREFERENCES
Denise L. Stiffarm
Abstract: Since 1978, custody proceedings involving Indian children have been subject to
the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act. The substantive provisions of the Act set forth
placement preferences for state courts to follow when determining adoptive, preadoptive, and
foster care placement of Indian children. While the Act directs that the preferences are to be
followed in the absence of good cause to the contrary, it does not include a corresponding
definition of what constitutes good cause. The result under this vague standard has been a lack
of uniformity in state court treatment of the "good cause" determination. This Comment
surveys the articulated policy and structure of ICWA, examines the disparities in state court
applications of the "good cause" standard, and then proposes that the guidelines issued by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs be uniformly instituted by Congress as binding regulations limiting
state court discretion and guiding the "good cause" determination.

Each individual is an amalgam of the predominant religious,
linguistic, ancestral and educational influences existent in his or her
surroundings.Indian people, whether residing on a reservation or not,
are immersed in an environment which is in most respects antitheticalto
their traditions.Furthermorethe cultural diversity among Indian tribes
is unquestionablyprofound yet often not fully appreciatedor adequately
protected in our society.

.

.

Preservation of Indian culture is

undoubtedly threatened and thereby thwarted as the size of any tribal
community dwindles. In addition to its artifacts, language and history,
the members of a tribe are its culture. Absent the next generation, any
culture is lost and necessarily relegated, at best, to anthropological
examination and categorization.
The consistent failure of state agencies to recognize the unique values
of Indian2 culture, coupled with shocking statistics indicating copious
and often unwarranted removal of Indian children from their families and
tribal communities, led Congress to adopt the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (ICWA or "the Act") This Comment addresses one facet of the
statutory regulation of Indian child welfare-the state court
I. In re M.E.M. Youth in Need of Care, 635 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Mont. 1981).
2. Because this Comment concerns the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, the term "Indian" as
used by Congress in the statute, will be used in lieu of the term "Native American."
3. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988 &
Supp. 1993)).

1151

Washington Law Review

Vol. 70:1151, 1995

determination of whether good cause exists to depart from the explicit
placement preferences of the Act. State courts often incorporate
discretionary standards in this determination that conflict with the object
and intent of ICWA. To effectively protect the rights guaranteed by the
Act, state court discretion must be circumscribed in a manner consistent
with the primary goals of the Act to protect the interests of Indian
children and the security of Indian tribes.
This Comment begins with an examination of the history of ICWA,
including the congressional policy pronounced within tie text and design
of the Act. Part II sets forth the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA)
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act. Part III outlines the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of ICWA and the corresponding
implications for state courts. Part IV surveys differing practices of state
courts resulting from the Act's failure to define what constitutes good
cause to depart from the statutory placement prefe:rences. It further
examines how a court's use of discretionary standards conflicts with the
articulated policy of the Act. Finally, part V recommends that Congress
codify the BIA Guidelines to direct the "good cause" determination in a
manner consistent with the policy of ICWA.
I.

THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978

The Indian Child Welfare Act constitutes an edict by Congress that
was meant to preserve the Indian tribes by establishing standards to
protect Indian children and keep them within their families and
communities whenever possible. Evidence of this purpose is clear in the
policy concerns articulated during congressional hearings preceding the
Act's passage and in the procedures constructed to implement the Act.
A.

History of ICWA

Recognition of the need to establish a federal policy regarding Indian
child welfare led Congress to enact ICWA. Beginning in 1973, Congress
conducted an assessment of the placement of Indian children in foster
care, institutions, and adoptive settings.4 The studies included statistical

4. The sponsor of the legislation, Representative Morris Udall, summerized the four years of
congressional hearings, oversight, and investigation as illuminating "a serious problem in Indian
child welfare which approaches crisis proportions." 124 Cong. Rec. 38,11)2 (1978) (statement of
Rep. Udall).
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data disclosing that placements regularly removed5 a high percentage of
Indian children from their homes and communities.6 The studies
expressly concluded that such removals often constituted unwarranted
actions by non-tribal agencies.7
Proponents of the Act cited the inherent bias for non-Indian values
exhibited by state agencies and officials in the placement process as a
major factor leading to a crisis in Indian child welfare.8 In assessing the
congressional investigation, the bill's sponsors asserted that the
prevailing problem in many placement determinations appeared to be the
failure to consider cultural and social differences between Indian and
non-Indian communities.9
Custody cases involving Indian children had recognized this "inherent
0
bias" prior to the legislative action. In Carle v. Carle,"
the trial court's
determination of custody between bi-cultural parents was found to be
premised on the assertion that the child would be more emotionally and
economically secure residing in a non-Indian, urban culture." In
reversing the custody decision, the Alaska Supreme Court indicated that
the placement decision was based on inappropriate cultural assumptions
reflecting primarily the values of the dominant culture and that it was not
the court's job to homogenize Alaskan society. 12 Justice Douglas's

5. The statistical data and expert testimony presented in an early Senate oversight hearing held in
1974 included a comment by one witness, William Byler, that current practices were akin to "'[t]he
wholesale removal of Indian children from their homes."' Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,32 (1989) (quoting Byler).
6. Studies conducted in 1969 and 1974 revealed that 25% to 35% of allIndian children had been
separated from their families and placed in adoptive families, foster care, or institutions. Holyfield,
490 U.S. at 32 (citing studies by the Association on American Indian Affairs, presented at Indian
Child Welfare Program, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sees., 15 (1974). Statistical surveys from individual
states indicated that a majority of Indian children were placed in non-Indian homes. 124 Cong. Rec.
38,102 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall). Some figures demonstrated that up to 95% of the children
in some states were placed in non-Indian foster or adoptive homes. Id. (statement of Rep.
Lagomarsino citing statistical survey published in 1976 by the Association on American Indian
Affairs).
7. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1988).
8. 124 Cong. Rec. 38,102 (1978) (statements by Rep. Udall and Rep. Lagomarsino).
9. Id.
10. 503 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1972).
11. Id. at 1053.
12. Id. at 1054-55 ("We think it is not permissible . . . to decide a child's custody on the
hypothesis that it is necessary to facilitate the child's adjustment to what is believed to be the
dominant culture. Such judgments are, in our view, not relevant to the determination of custody
issues!").
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dissenting opinion in DeCoteau v. District County Court" demonstrates
a similar concern about accounting for unique cultural considerations in
such custody determinations. Justice Douglas expressed the view that the
welfare of a child necessarily must be considered with an understanding
of the relevant family structure and background culture. 4
The legislative history of the Act indicates that many determinations
regarding the welfare of Indian children resulted from misapplication of
non-Indian standards to the Indian social system. 5 Decisions made under
these standards led to findings that many Indian parents were not only
socially irresponsible, but also possessed inadequate child-rearing
capabilities. 6 These conclusions often were received with disbelief by
the Indian community where cultural perceptions
of child-rearing may
7
vary fundamentally from non-Indian standards.
For instance, social workers often perceive that a child taken care of
by someone outside of the nuclear family constitutes evidence of neglect
by the child's parents. 8 However, reliance on the network of family
members as responsible caregivers is common in Indian families, in
contrast to mainstream child-rearing practices. 9 The legislative history of
the Act recognized that decisions in Indian child welfare cases often were
affected by state agencies' ignorance of such fundamental
considerations."

13. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
14. Id. at 465 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
15. "[W]itnesses reiterate time and again the failure or inability of State agencies, courts, and
procedures to fairly consider the differing cultural and social norms in Indian communities and
families." 124 Cong. Rec. 38,102 (1978) (statement of'Rep. Lagomarsino).
16. "[S]ocial workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social norm, make decisions that are
wholly inappropriate in the context of Indian family life and so they frequa-ntly discover neglect or
abandonment where none exists." H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Ses.,;. 10 (1978), reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7532.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Carolyn Attneave, The Wasted Strengths of Indian Families, in The Destruction of American
Indian Families 29, 30 (Steven Unger ed., 1977) [hereinafter Unger]; Aileen Red Bird & Patrick
Melendy, Indian Child Welfare in Oregon, in Unger at 43. See also Evelyn Blanchard, The Question
of Best Interest, in Unger at 57, 59 (stating that composition of Indian fardly is more than mother,
father, and children, rather it includes large network of relationships).
20. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supra note 16, at 10-11, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7532-33.
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B.

ICWA 's Presumption ofServing the Best Interests of Indian
Children

Extensive discussion in ICWA's legislative history addresses the
impact wrought by decisions that placed Indian children outside of their
native culture. Specific concern was directed to findings that placement
of Indian children in non-Indian settings had both a detrimental effect on
the long-term survival of individual tribes and on the social and
psychological health of many Indian children.21
Having determined that state courts and agencies often failed to
recognize Indian cultural standards,' Congress stated in the preamble of
ICWA that the Act was intended
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique
values of Indian culture.'
C.

ICWA ProvidesPreferredProceduresTo Effectively Implement Its
Policy

1.

Preferencefor Tribal Courts

To effectively accommodate the unique values of Indian culture,
ICWA designates tribal courts as the preferred forum for adjudicating
Indian child welfare cases. The Act provides that an Indian tribe will
have exclusive jurisdiction in child custody proceedings involving an
Indian child residing or domiciled on a reservation.24 In cases where a
state court exercises jurisdiction over an Indian child not domiciled on a

21. American Indian Policy Review Commission, Report on Federal, State, and Tribal
Jurisdiction(Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 597, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 52 (1977)
[hereinafter AIPRC Report].
22. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1988).
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
24. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988). This section of the Act includes an exception where Federal Law
PL 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)), has vested jurisdiction over reservations in civil and criminal
matters in the state. Commentary in the legislative history indicates the recognition that the choice of
forum has considerable influence in custody proceedings as a result of the bias inherent in the
decisionmaker's culture. ALPRC Report, supranote 21, reprintedin S. Rep. No. 597, at 44.
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reservation, the Act requires transfer to the appropriate tribal court upon
the request of the parents or the Indian tribe.' The Act further provides
that state courts may retain jurisdiction in instances where there is good
cause not to transfer the proceeding to a tribal court, 6 when either parent
objects to the transfer, or when the tribal court itself declines
jurisdiction.27
2.

Preferencefor Placement in Indian Homes and Communities

When a state court retains jurisdiction over an adoptive placement
proceeding involving an Indian child, ICWA delineates explicit
placement preferences to guide the state court's placement
determination." Specifically, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the
contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended
family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other
Indian families.29
The Act specifies similar preferences for foster and preadoptive
placements. 0 In meeting the Act's preference requirements, state
courts-pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d)-must adhere to the prevailing
social and cultural standards of the Indian community in which the

25. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
26. The Act itself fails to define what constitutes "good cause" for denying transfer to the tribal
court.
27. 25 U.S.C. § 1911o(b).
28. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). The legislative history of the Act specifically states that subsections
1915(a) and (b) further the federal policy that an Indian child should remain, where possible, in the
Indian community, but that the subsections are not to be read as precluding placement of an Indian
child with a non-Indian family. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supra note 16, at 23, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7546. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Mississippi B;md of Choctaw Indians
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), identified § 1915(a) as the most important substantive requirement
imposed on state courts by ICWA. Id. at 36. See discussion infra notes 51-53 and accompanying
text.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1988) provides:
In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, to a placement with- (i) a member of the Indian child's extended family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child's tribe; (iii) an Indian
foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or (iv) an
institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization which
has a program suitable to meet the Indian child's needs.
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parent or extended family resides or maintains social and cultural ties.3"
Thus, the directive in § 1915(d) limits the discretion of state agencies in
placement decisions. 2
ICWA FailsTo Define "Good Cause" To Departfrom the
PlacementPreferences of 25 U.S.C. § 1915

3.

ICWA does not define the circumstances that constitute "good cause"
to deviate from the placement preferences of 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and
(b). Both the text of ICWA and the legislative history fail to specify
when a court may justly depart from the Act's explicit placement
preferences. The only guidance is a statement from the legislative history
explaining that § 1915 establishes a federal policy of keeping Indian
children within Indian communities whenever possible.3 3
II.

BIA INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE TO STATE COURTS
DECIDING INDIAN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS

The Act specifically directs the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate
regulations implementing ICWA.34 Instead, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
issued guidelines to provide interpretive guidance and assistance to state
courts applying the Act. The introductory statement accompanying the
guidelines sets forth that many of the guidelines provide procedures to
assure that the rights guaranteed by the Act are protected.3 5 The
guidelines were not issued as regulations as they were not intended to be
binding.36 Despite ICWA's failure to define "good cause," the guidelines
issued by the BIA will, if applied, overcome the Act's deficiency.
31. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
32. The explicit statement in the House Report regarding subsection (d) is that "[a]ll too often,
State public and private agencies, in determining whether or not an Indian family is fit for foster care
or adoptive placement of an Indian child, apply a white, middle-class standard which, in many cases,
forecloses placement with the Indian family." H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supranote 16, at 24, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7546. See also AIPRC Report,supra note 21, reprintedin S.Rep. No. 597, at
45. Statements in the legislative history discounted assertions by non-Indian agencies that Indian
foster and adoptive parents were difficult to find. Rather, studies indicated that the home-approval
criteria utilized by these agencies was inappropriate in relation to the financial status and lifestyles of
many Indian families. As a result, suitable relatives and other Indian families were often eliminated

in placement considerations. Id.
33. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supra note 16, at 23, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7546.
34. 25 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988).
35. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,583, 67,584
(1979) [hereinafter BIA Guidelines].
36. Id.
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The guidelines are predicated on an explicit policy statement
recognizing ICWA as an expression of Congress's preference to keep
Indian children with their families or tribes.37 Where a state court
determining an Indian child's custody renders a decision contrary to the
express preferences, the guidelines indicate that the court must justify its
decision by following strict procedures.38 Further, the guidelines indicate
that liberal rules of construction should be applied to the Act, its
implementing regulations, the recommended guidelines,, and to any state
statutes to achieve a result consistent with the preferences expressed by
Congress.39
For purposes of foster care, preadoptive, or adoptive placement under
25 U.S.C. § 1915, the BIA Guidelines describe a procedure for state
courts to follow in determining whether good cause exists to deviate
from the placement preferences. Specifically, § F.3(a) of the guidelines
states:
[A] determination of good cause not to follow the order of
preference . . .shall be based on one or more of the following
considerations: (i) The request of the biological parents or the child
when the child is of sufficient age. (ii) The extraordinary physical
or emotional needs of the child as established by testimony of a
qualified expert witness. (iii) The unavailability of suitable families
for placement after a diligent search has been completed for
families meeting the preference criteria.4"
The guidelines further recommend that because the Act contains a clear
preference for placements within tribal culture, the party seeking an
exception to the statutory placement preferences
should bear the burden
4
of proving that such an exception is necessary. '
The BIA Guidelines specifically outline the necessary attributes that
qualify an expert witness to determine whether a child's extraordinary
physical or emotional needs constitute "good cause." 42 Qualified experts
37. Id. § A(l).
38. Id.
39. Id. The policy statement further specifies that any ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of
the result most consistent with the congressional preference of keeping Indian children with their
families or tribes. Id.
40. Id. § F.3(a).
41. Id. § F.3 Commentary.
42. The legislative history indicates that the phrase "qualified expert witness" is intended to refer
to those individuals possessing expertise beyond the "normal social worker qualifications." H.R.
Rep. No. 1386, supra note 16, at 22, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7545. Essentially, for an
individual to testify in a placement proceeding as a qualified expert, the guidelines deem it necessary
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include members of the Indian child's tribe recognized as knowledgeable
in tribal customs of family organization and child-rearing practices,. lay
experts with substantial experience in Indian family services and
knowledge of the prevailing cultural standards and child-rearing
practices of the child's tribe,' and professional persons having
substantial education and experience within that individual's specialty.45
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF ICWA
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfleld 46 suggests that the BIA Guidelines are in accord
with the Court's perception of the policy concerns underlying ICWA.47
In discussing the need for a uniform definition of "domicile" to
effectuate ICWA's goals, the Holyfield Court engaged in an extensive
discussion and analysis of the text and legislative history of the Act.
The Court specifically found that the Act, read in its entirety,
demonstrates a purpose to curtail state authority.48 Having this purpose in
mind, the Court found it illogical to assume that Congress would have
intended to rely on state law to define "domicile," a critical term that
would determine the scope of the Act's key jurisdictional provision.49
Further, the Court found that Congress could not have intended a lack of
for the court to determine that the person has sufficient knowledge of tribal culture and child-rearing
practices. BIA Guidelines, supranote 35, § D.4 Commentary.
43. BIA Guidelines, supra note 35, § DA(b)(i).
44. Id. § D.4(b)(ii).
45. Id. § D.4(b)(iii).
46. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
47. The opinion focused on the meaning of "domicile" in the Act to determine jurisdiction over
proceedings involving Indian children. In holding that individual state law definitions of domicile
defeat the objectives of the federal statute, the Court found that this critical term of the Act required a
uniform definition. Id. at 43-47.
48. Id. at 45 n.17 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1911-1916, 1918). Notably, the Court stated:
[T]he purpose of the ICWA gives no reason to believe that Congress intended to rely on state
law for the definition of a critical term .... It is clear from the very text of the ICWA, not to
mention its legislative history... that Congress was concerned with the rights of Indian families
and Indian communities vis-A-vis state authorities.... Congress perceived the States and their
courts as partly responsible for the problem it intended to correct.
Id. at 44-45.
49. Id. In interpreting the statute, the Court began with the general principle that without an
express indication to the contrary, federal statutes are intended to have uniform nationwide
application. The intent and purpose of the statute further must be considered to determine if
application of state law would impair the federal program. Id. at 43-44 (citing Jerome v. United
States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)).
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nationwide uniformity resulting from varying state law definitions to
control jurisdiction under the Act, as this would result in a statute under
which different rules could apply to a child moved from one state to
another.5
The Court recognized that congressional concern regarding state court
and agency practices in Indian child custody proceedings played a
significant role in the formulation of the protections contained in the
Act.5 1 Specifically, the Court noted that 25 U.S.C. § 1915 was designed
to establish standards for state court proceedings to promote ICWA's
goals. 2 This conclusion was further premised on tihe congressional
statement that state courts often failed to consider the unique culture of
the Indian community when making placement derisions regarding
Indian children.53
The Court determined in Holyfleld that it was implausible for
Congress to have designed the statute in a way that would allow varying
state law definitions of domicile to compromise the intended effect of
federal regulation. 4 This analysis logically extenc; to address the
problem of defining "good cause."55 As with domicile, "good cause" as
used in § 1915 is not defined in ICWA and must be interpreted in a
manner consistent with congressional intent.
IV. VARIATIONS IN STATE COURT APPLICATIONS OF THE 25
U.S.C. § 1915 "GOOD CAUSE" EXCEPTION
The absence of an explicit definition of "good cause" in 25 U.S.C.
§ 1915 has resulted in discordant applications of the term by state courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court's resolution in Holyfield indicates disfavor for
varied interpretations, especially because some state courts have

50. Id. at 46. The Court found that because of this result, the general rule that domicile is
determined according to the law of the forum is inapplicable under ICWA. Id. at 46 n.21.
51. Id. at 32-37 (discussing various hearings, reports, and statements contained in legislative
history of ICWA).
52. Id. at 37 n.6.
53. Id. at 45 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5)).
54. See supranotes 48-49 and accompanying text.
55. See 490 U.S. at 47 (using general principle that in absence of statutory definition, court will
start with assumption that legislative purpose is expressed by ordinary menming of words used, by
reference to object and policy of statute). For a general discussion of using the Holyfield analysis to
interpret provisions of ICWA, see Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795, 806-14 (Or. 1994) (Unis, J.,
dissenting).
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interpreted "good cause" in a manner that conflicts with the statutory
purpose.
A.

Some State CourtsHave Applied ICWA 's "Good Cause" Exception
in Disregardof the Act's Intent

1.

DeterminingGood Cause Based upon a Traditional "BestInterests
of the Child" Standard

In applying ICWA's placement preferences, some courts have relied
almost exclusively on a traditional best interests test to determine if good
cause existed to place the child outside of the Act's preference scheme. 6
The Supreme Court of Nebraska fashioned a notable statement with
regard to the interplay between the placement directives and state court
determinations in In re BirdHeady The court first noted that the Act did
not strictly require adherence to the designated preferences, but rather
only required that the preferences be followed in the absence of good
cause to the contrary." The court further stated that state court use of the
"good cause" provision was in accord with a directive in the legislative
history of ICWA that state courts were to have flexibility in determining
the placement of Indian children. 9 Finally, the court concluded that
ICWA "does not change the cardinal rule that the best interests of the
child are paramount, although it may alter its focus." 6
The lower court in Bird Head had made specific findings to conclude
that good cause existed to deny custody to the child's aunt. 6' However,
the state supreme court noted that the lower court made no findings as to
why statutorily preferred placements with other available family or tribal
members were not considered over placement with a non-Indian foster
couple. 2 The Supreme Court of Nebraska remanded the case for
56. One commentator formulated a succinct statement of the "best interest" standard generally
employed by state courts as being a measure using middle class values to determine a setting that
will best protect the child from physical or emotional injury while also enriching the child
physically, emotionally, and educationally. Racial, ethnic, and religious factors are viewed as
subordinate concerns in this determination. Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the
Indian Child WelfareAct and the UnstatedBest Interestof the Child Test, 27 Gonz. L. Rev. 353, 368

(1991/92).
57. 331 N.W.2d 785 (Neb. 1983).
58. Id. at 790.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 791.
Id.
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at790.
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consideration of whether good cause existed to not pla.ce the child with
other family or tribal members. However, the remand was tempered by
the court's emphasis that ICWA did not trump the traditional "best
63
interests" test.
A similar imposition of a traditional "best interest" standard is
illustrated by In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525. 64 In
In re MaricopaCounty, the Gila River Indian Community challenged the
continued adoptive placement of an infant by an Arizona social service
agency with a non-Indian mother, contending that the trial court had
erroneously weighed the bond between the adoptive parent and child
against the interest of maintaining the child's ties to the tribal
community.65 While recognizing that the Act seeks to maintain the
child's connection with his or her tribe, the Arizona appellate court
emphasized that the child's best interests were of primary concern.66 The
court refused to vacate the adoption order after considering the child's
best interests in view of the parent-child relationship that had developed
with the adoptive mother.67
Such use of a traditional "best interests" standard is in direct conflict
with the Act.6" The "best interests of Indian children' must be viewed
within the context of ICWA.69 The explicit policy statement in the Act is
to "protect the best interests of Indian children ... by the establishment
of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from
63. Id. at 791. See also In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1988). The Oklahoma Supreme Court
directed that to adequately determine the "good cause" question in preadoptive placement, an inquiry
must be made as to whether the tribe had an available foster home. However, the court further stated
that consideration of the "good cause" exception of § 1915 should be exercised according to the
child's best interest. Id. at 870 (citing Bird Head,331 N.W.2d at 791).
64. 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
65. Id. at 233.
66. Id. at 234. "Congress envisioned situations in which the child's best interest may override a
tribal or family interest-the preferences for placement are to be followed absent 'good cause to the
contrary."' Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (b)).
67. Id.
68. Russel L. Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A CriticalAnalysis, 31 Hastings L.J.
1287, 1297 (1980) (stating that "best interest" standard incorporates cul-ural and family values
which are often in opposition to those values held by Indian family) (citing American Indian Policy
Review Commission, Report on Federal, State, and Tribal Jurisdiction (Comm. Print 1976), Indian
Child Welfare Program:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs 9f the Senate Comm. on
Interiorand Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 57-58 (statement of Drs Carl Mindell and Alan
Gurwitt)); Blanchard, supranote 20, at 58 (recognizing that difficulties arise when decision-makers
interpret child's best interests only within context of their own value systems, which limits
evaluation to only small segment of Indian child's life experience).
69. Dale, supra note 56, at 370. See also H.R. Rep. 1386, supra note 16, at 23-24, reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7546.
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their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture."70 This
statement mandates consideration of the Indian cultural value system as
central to the determination of what is in the best interest of an Indian
child.71
As recognized in ICWA's congressional findings, state agencies often
fail to consider the cultural and social standards of Indian communities in
Indian child custody proceedings.72 Indian culture has been recognized as
fundamentally distinct in some instances from mainstream standards.73
Accordingly, a court's adherence to mainstream standards will be
inconsistent with the policy considerations set forth in ICWA.
2.

Application of a Multi-FactorialAnalysisfor DeterminingGood
Cause

Some state courts have devised analyses that consider various
discretionary factors, in conjunction with the child's best interests, to
determine whether good cause exists to abandon the placement
preferences. Like the traditional "best interests" test, this approach also
fails to implement the policy behind ICWA.
An example of this mixed approach is the decision of a Washington
appellate court in Doe v. Navajo Nation.74 The court first asserted that
ICWA provides the trial court with the discretion to determine the
existence of good cause for nonpreferential placement.7 5 Next, the court
fashioned a nonexhaustive list of factors to guide the lower court. This
list included not only the best interests of the child, but also the wishes of
the biological parents, the suitability of persons designated by the

70. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
71. Dale, supranote 56, at 370-71. See also In re M.T.S., 489 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) ("[T]he ICWA includes standards which adequately protect the best interests of the child.).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5).
73. Manuel P. Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Response to the Threat to Indian
Culture Caused by Fosterand Adoptive Placements of Indian Children, 7 Am. Indian L. Rev. 51,
56-57 (1979). See also H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supra note 16, at 10, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
7532 (indicating ignorance of state agencies as to values and social norms of Indian culture).
74. 66 Wash. App. 475, 832 P.2d 518 (1992). The lower court had erroneously failed to apply
ICWA in considering the placement of an Indian child with non-Indian adoptive parents. Before
remanding the case to be adjudicated pursuant to the Act, the appellate court provided an instructive
discussion of what basis the lower court could use in determining if good cause existed to depart
from the placement preferences of§ 1915(a).
75. Id. at 482, 832 P.2d at 522 (citing hz re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667
P.2d 228, 234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)).
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placement preferences, the child's current ties with the tribe, and the
perceived ability of the child to adjust to the culture of a particular
placement.76
The court in Doe v. Navajo Nation fashioned a definition of good
cause far beyond what was actually necessary to adjudicate the
proceeding. The child's biological parents had selected a non-Indian
adoptive couple for placement and each had executed a written consent
to the adoption." Application of the BIA Guidelines, which recognize
the request of a biological parent as a basis for good cause, would have
appropriately resolved the contested placement.78 However, the court's
act of defining good cause as a manifold tool of discretion enunciated a
policy validating the imposition of mainstream values in Indian child
custody proceedings.
Subsequently, the Alaska Supreme Court in In re F.H.79 reiterated the
position that the exercise of a trial court's discretion ia determining the
existence of good cause rests on the balancing of several factors.8" After
recognizing that the Act itself fails to define "good cause," the court
rejected the Noatak Village's argument that the placement preferences
set forth under 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) must first be excluded as viable
options before any alternate placement is considered. The court's
position was that such an interpretation ignored the "good cause"
exception. 81
The placement deviation in bI re F.H. appears facially to be in accord
with the Act's structure. The court confirmed that the lower court had
properly evaluated a number of factors in determining good cause. These
factors included the biological mother's relinquishment of her parental
rights to the adoptive parents, the bond that had developed between the
adoptive mother and the child, the uncertainty of the child's future if the
adoption were invalidated, and the character of the particular adoption,
which provided the biological family continued access to the child.82 The
76. Id.
77. Id. at 476-77, 832 P.2d at 519. The litigation resulted when the Navajo Nation intervened in
the action, seeking to place the child with her paternal aunt who resided on the reservation. The
child's biological parents both opposed this placement option. Id.
78. See supratext accompanying note 40.
79. 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993).
80. Id. at 1363-64 (citing Doe v. Navajo Nation, 66 Wash. App. at 482, 832 P.2d at 522).
81. Id. at 1364 n.3.
82. Id. at 1364. A recent decision by the Alaska Supreme Court further illustrates the court's
reluctance to abide by the BIA Guidelines. The court recognized the guidelines as offering
"examples" of the kinds of factors that can provide a court with good cause to depart from placement
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supreme court recognized that because the lower court had considered
parental preference, its deliberations fell within the provisions of the BIA
Guidelines for determining the existence of good cause under § 1915.83
An examination of the case facts, however, reveals that the breadth of
discretion afforded by an ambiguous "good cause" definition will permit
evasion of ICWA's express policy. The decision to place the child with a
non-Indian couple was upheld despite the availability of placement with
a suitable extended family member within the preferences of § 1915(a). 84
The Noatak Village argued that the mother's preference should be
accorded little weight as she had made similar offers to others in the past,
at one time had opposed placement with the adoptive couple, and had
admitted that when she signed the relinquishment she was "so mixed up
she would have signed anything."85 The Alaska Supreme Court declined
to find consideration of the biological mother's preference erroneous.8 6
The court further found that all of the factors considered by the lower
court were properly within the "good cause" determination," suggesting
that the same conclusion could have
been reached even in the absence of
88
the biological mother's request.
Notably, both the Washington and Alaska courts emphasized that the
list of factors that a court may consider in determining good cause is
within the Act's preferences. The court concluded by stating that "the list is not exhaustive.
Although ICWA and the guidelines draw attention to important considerations, the best interests of
the child remain paramount." In re N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934, 936-37 (Alaska 1994) (citing In re Bird
Head, 331 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Neb. 1983), discussed supra text accompanying notes 57-60).
83. 851 P.2d at 1364-65.
84. Id. at 1362. The Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS) for the state of Alaska had
recommended that the child be placed with the mother's cousin who resided in the Native Village of
Noatak. Id.
85. Id. at 1364-65.
86. Id. at 1365. The court based this decision on the probate master's certification that the
biological mother had understood her actions and had voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. Id.
87. Id.
88. The other factors considered also tend to evoke debate. For example, the court stressed
concern with the uncertainty of the child's custody if the adoption petition was dismissed. This was
despite the fact that the DFYS had recommended immediate adoptive placement with the mother's
cousin. The court's concern with "uncertainty" was based upon the necessity of further legal
proceedings to effect this adoption by the cousin. Id. The court also asserted that the character of the
adoption arrangement with the non-Indian couple, allowing the biological mother continued access
to the child and "exposure to her Native American heritage" supported the finding of good cause. Id.
at 1363. However, the cousin had submitted an affidavit indicating similar willingness and the
Noatak Village had offered an excerpt from a study of Northwest Alaskan Family traditions that
supported such an arrangement. Id. On review, however, the court found it significant that it would
be easier for the biological mother to visit the child in the location of the non-Indian couple than in
the Village ofNoatak. Id. at 1365.
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nonexhaustive 9 Such an analysis permits trial courts to invoke an
extensive range of discretionary factors that, taken together, will
frequently reflect the standards of the majority culttue rather than the
Indian culture. Thus, courts can appear to be in compliance with ICWA's
directives, while at the same time actually perpetuating the very ills the
Act was intended to correct.
B.

Some State CourtDeterminationsof Good Cause Are Consistent
with ICWA 's Intent

1.

Recognition ofICWA 's Presumptionof Serving the Best Interests of
Indian Children

Some state courts have acknowledged that ICWA's design
incorporates the best interests of Indian children.." In analyzing
application of a state "best interests of the child" standerd, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals concluded that ICWA itself presumes the child's
interests are best served by placement within the directives of § 1915."'
The appeals court affirmed a decision to place the child with his
biological Indian grandmother, rather than with the non-Indian foster
parents who wished to adopt him, finding that the lower court's decision
complied with the Act.92 Following the BIA Guidelines., the appeals court
found that good cause to defeat ICWA's expressed preferences had not
been established by the assertion that separation from the foster home
would be initially painful for the child. Rather, the court held that placing
the child with a suitable relative was presumptively in his best interests
pursuant to the design of the Act.93
ICWA's presumption that the best interests of Indian children are met
through protecting their tribal connection was further articulated in In re
Baby Girl Doe.94 The trial court had held that the biological mother's
desire for anonymity in the adoptive placement of her child prevailed

89. Doe v. Navajo Nation, 66 Wash. App. 475, 482, 832 P.2d 518, 522 (1992); In re F.H., 851
P.2d at 1364-65.
90. See, e.g., In re Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684, 685-86 n.2 (Okla. 1991) (as.erting that protection of
Indian child's relationship to his or her tribe was recognized by Congress as value that must be
protected in the child's best interest).
91. In re M.T.S., 489 N.W.2d 285,287 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
92. Id. at288.
93. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1902 for proposition that "establishment of minimum federal standards
is to protect the best interests of Indian children").
94. 865 P.2d 1090 (Mont. 1993).
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over the tribe's attempt to enforce the placement preferences.' The tribe
sought the mother's identity in order to determine if the child could be
placed with an extended family member in accordance with the
placement directives.96 The Montana Supreme Court sided with the tribe,
reasoning that the principal purpose of the Act was "'to protect the rights
of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community
and tribe in retaining its children in its society."' 97 The court concluded
that compliance with the mother's request under these circumstances
would defeat the expressed intent of ICWA and would disregard the
preference provided in § 1915(a)(1) for placement with an extended
family member.98
2.

Adherence to the BLI Guidelines To Evaluate Good Cause: The
Campbell Approach

A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Minnesota illustrates
appropriate judicial compliance with the BIA Guidelines.9 9 At issue in
Campbell v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians was whether a
child's need for permanence constituted an "extraordinary emotional
need"--one of the "good cause" exceptions specified in the BIA
Guidelines." ° The trial court found, pursuant to expert witness testimony,
that the children involved had an extraordinary emotional need for
permanence that could be met only through adoption. The trial court
asserted that this, coupled with the lack of a suitable Indian family to
provide adoptive placement, warranted placement outside of the Act's
preferences. The court further found that the best interests of the children
required immediate placement with their former non-Indian foster

95. Id at 1090. Under § 1915(c) of the Act, courts are directed to give weight to a biological
parent's desire for anonymity in applying the preferences. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988).
96. 865 P.2d at 1091.
97. Id. at 1094 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supra note 16, at 23, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7546 and citing the U.S. Supreme Court's discussion of the legislative history
accompanying § 1915(a) in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36-37
(1989), discussed supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text).
98. Id. at 1095. The court looked to the policy interpretation of the Act as articulated in Holyfield
to reach the conclusion that to best effectuate the principal purpose for which the Act was created,
compliance with the order of preferences set forth in subsections 1915(a) and (b) was required. Id. at

1094-95.
99. In re S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, Campbell v. Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians, 115 S.Ct. 935 (1995) [hereinafter Campbell.
100. See BIA Guidelines, supra text accompanying note 40.
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family.'0 ' The state supreme court reversed, holding that while courts
may consider a child's need for stability, a "need to be adopted," by
itself, does not constitute good cause.'0 2
The Minnesota court, citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield,0 3 reiterated that the Indian child welfare crisis was in part a
result of practices in state court proceedings and that ICWA mandated
that Indian child welfare determinations not be based on a "white,
middle-class standard."'" Relying on the policy statement in 25 U.S.C.
§ 1902, the court found that the Act itself presumes that placement
within § 1915's preferences is in the best interests of Indian children.'0 5
The court concluded that using a subjective "best inl:erest" standard to
evaluate placement would only serve to further the abuses in state court
proceedings
that Congress sought to eliminate througa the enactment of
06
ICWA1
The Campbell court then adopted the BIA Guidelines as the
appropriate range of factors for a state court to utilize in determining
whether good cause exists to depart from the placement preferences. 7
Central to the court's resolution was the specific language of the
guidelines themselves, which state that a determination of good cause
"shall" be based on the factors set forth therein.' The court held that this
unambiguous statement suggested strongly that, while the guidelines
were not binding on state courts, they should be regarded as limiting the
factors that should be considered in determining whather good cause in
fact exists."'

101. In re S.E.G., 507 N.W.2d 872, 880 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn.
1994), cert. denied, Campbell v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians., 115 S. Ct. 935 (1995). The
court of appeals considered both the factors delineated in the BIA Guidelines and in case law that
utilized the best interests of the child standard to affirm the determination of the trial court that good
cause existed to deviate from the placement preferences. Id. at 879-80 (citing In re F.H., 851 P.2d
1361, 1363-64 (Alaska 1993)). The appellate court specifically noted that "the best interests and
extraordinary needs of the children may require that alternatives be considered." Id. at 881.
102. 521 N.W.2d at 358.
103. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). See supranotes 48-53 and accompanying text.
104. 521 N.W.2d at 359 (quoting Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 37).
105. Id. at 362.
106. Id. at 362-63. This conclusion was premised on the assertion that the nature of a traditional
"best interests" standard requires "a subjective evaluation of a multitade of factors.., which are
imbued with the values of majority culture" Id. at 363.
107. Id.
108. See discussion of BIA Guidelines, supranotes 40-41 and accompanying text
109. 521 N.W.2d at 363.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court in Campbell found that the lower court
had erred in determining that "permanence" could be met only through
adoption because the lower court had not considered that Indian cultures
might define permanence differently from the dominant culture."' The
court further stated that because § 1915(d) requires that state courts apply
the prevailing social and cultural standards of the relevant Indian
community when evaluating the preference requirements, the "need for
permanence" should not be defined so narrowly as to threaten or
substantially reduce placements in Indian homes."' Additionally, the
court found that none of the witnesses who testified that the children had
extraordinary emotional needs was a "qualified expert witness" as
defined in the BIA Guidelines. As a result, the court found that the lower
court erroneously relied on this testimony to find good cause."' The
court specifically found that the need for permanence could be met in the
children's current Indian foster home."'
Campbell demonstrates how proper use of the BIA Guidelines can
restrain state court discretion and abate determinations of good cause that
are predicated on mainstream values. By using the guidelines to
accommodate tribal social and cultural standards, the Minnesota court
correctly identified a placement meeting the best interests of the Indian
children consistent with the statutory intent of ICWA.
V.

CLARIFYING THE DETERMINATION OF GOOD CAUSE

Despite its intended purpose, the Act is subject to varying
interpretations that give state courts considerable latitude in deciding
whether to follow the placement preferences."' The Campbell court's

110. Id. at 364.
111. Id. One witness in the custody proceeding testified that permanence for one of the children
could be accomplished through an ongoing attachment to the tribe. The supreme court opinion cites
the record of the 1974 Senate hearings to support the tribe's claim that permanency is defined
differently in Native American cultures. Id. Additionally, the opinion refers to a statement made by
the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services asserting that preferring adoption over other
placement options such as permanent foster care as criteria for finding "suitable families for
placement" may result in more placements outside of Indian communities. Id. at 363-64.
112. Id. at 365. The state supreme court specifically noted that among the experts who had been
properly qualified under the guidelines, there was no testimony that the children's extraordinary
emotional needs were not being met in their current placement. Id.
113. Id.
114. Barsh, supra note 68, at 1320 (stating that undefined "good cause" phrase in § 1915 allows
state courts to continue pre-ICWA practices of applying inappropriate cultural standards to
placement decisions involving Indian children).
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analysis illustrates how one court was able to determine good cause in a
manner consonant with the Act's intent. Consistent criteria should be
established to resolve current disparate practices and to set the proper
limits on the amount of discretion that state courts may employ when
determining good cause under 25 U.S.C. § 1915. If the BIA Guidelines
were codified, this would reduce state courts' discretion and guide the
"good cause" determination.
A.

Case Law Illustratesthe Appropriatenessof Using the BIA
Guidelines To Furtherthe Intent of ICWA

The Campbell court's embrace of the BIA Guidelines is compelling." 5
The alternative, permitting each state to craft its own definition of a
critical term in ICWA, defeats the goal of curtailing state authority by
allowing state courts to apply a malleable tool of discretion predicated on
mainstream values. This axiom is supported by the Holyfield statement
that a single definition of "domicile" is necessary to comport with the
policy of the Act, as opposed to allowing each state court to define the
term." 6 ICWA's undefined use of "good cause" in § 1915 should be
interpreted accordingly to effect uniform implementation of federal
regulation under the Act. 7
Some state courts have recognized that ICWA is predicated on an
assumption that adherence to the placement preferences is in the best
interests of Indian children."' 8 This assumption followsi from the explicit
policy statement contained in 25 U.S.C. § 1902 and the corresponding
legislative history articulating that the controlling precept of the Act is
the best interests of the Indian child.' 9 As the Campbell court stated, it
seems "'most improbable' that Congress intended to allow state courts to
find good cause whenever they determined that a placement outside the
preferences of § 1915 was in the Indian child's best interests.' 20
115. See supranotes 103-13 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. See also Campbell, 521 N.W.2d at 362-63
(recognizing statement in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,45 (1989),
that the Act and its legislative history read together demonstrate effort to curtail state authority,
Minnesota Supreme Court asserted that allowing state court to use subjective "best interest of the
child" standard is similar to allowing differing state definitions of domicile).
117. See supranotes 54-55 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Campbell, 521 N.W.2d at 362 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1902); In re M.T.S., 489 N.W.2d
285,287 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); In re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Mont. 1993).
119. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supra note 16, at 19, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7542.
120. 521 N.W.2d at 363 (citing Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45). See discussior supra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text of Campbell's recognition that subjective evaluations by state courts contradict
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Congress intended to establish a uniform federal law to alleviate
12
unwarranted removal of Indian children from their tribal communities. '
In view of the underlying policy of ICWA' and the definite statement in
the BIA Guidelines § F.3 as to what constitutes good cause,"z any
discretion exercised by state courts should be limited to a finding
pursuant to the guidelines' listed factors.
B.

Using the BL4 Guidelines Will Ensure CorrectApplication ofICWA
in State Court Proceedings

Codifying the BIA Guidelines § F.3 to determine appropriate
circumstances of good cause to deviate from the placement preferences
will lead to the uniformity necessary to accomplish the goals of the Act.
Commentators have recognized that the BIA Guidelines provide an
effective means for implementing ICWA. 24 Because the guidelines
represent the BIA's interpretation of ICWA, they are useful in
interpreting its provisions."z This is particularly compelling where an
analysis of the pertinent issues indicates 26
that the guidelines are designed
ICWA.
of
aims
primary
the
effectuate
to
the intent oflCWA to remedy the Indian child welfare crisis identified as resulting in large part from
the practices of state agencies.
121. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. The Court in Holyfield interpreted the
congressional findings to draw an "inescapable" conclusion that the statute read in whole dictated an
attempt to curtail state authority. 490 U.S. at 45 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1911-1916, 1918).
122. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
124. E.g., Peter W. Gorman & Michelle T. Paquin, A Minnesota Lawyer's Guide to the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 10 Law & Ineq. J. 311, 321-22 (1992) (postulating that as goal of ICWA was to
establish minimum standards, many portions of the Act prescribe only bare outlines of recommended
procedures, and guidelines operate to fill gaps left in these outlines to provide direction as to what
Congress intended).
125. See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228, 232 n.4 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1983) (finding BIA Guidelines useful source of information to answer questions regarding
implementation of ICWA); Department of Social Serv. v. Diana L. (In re Junious M.), 193 Cal. Rptr.
40, 43-44 & n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding BIA Guidelines to be correct interpretation of the Act
to guide determination of whether child was an "Indian child" within meaning of the Act); People ex
rel. J.L.P., 870 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (using guidelines to determine whether good
cause exists to not transfer jurisdiction pursuant to directives of 25 U.S.C. § 1911); In re Armell, 550
N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct.) (finding that BIA guidelines, while not controlling, must be
accorded great weight in construing ICWA), appeal denied sub nom. Armell v. Prairie Band of
Potawatomi Indians, 555 N.E.2d 374 (IL1.), cert. denied,Armell Through Murphy v. Prairie Band of
Potawatomi Indians, 498 U.S. 940 (1990).
126. See In re M.E.M. Youth in Need of Care, 635 P.2d 1313, 1317-18 (Mont. 1981) (adhering to
BIA Guidelines in decision regarding proper foundation for expert opinion; court's employment of
guidelines was premised on statement that guidelines "comport with the spirit of the Indian Child
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A uniform application of the guidelines could eliminate the use of
subjective evaluation standards that contradict the goal of ICWA to
curtail state authority. While state courts are advised to consider the
guidelines, 27 they are currently free to act contrary to the guidelines if
they believe that the statute itself does not require that the guidelines be
12
followed. 1
C.

A ProposalforRegulatedImplementation of the BIA Guidelines
and Statutory ClarificationTo Define "Good Cause"

A concise statement by Congress to guide the determination of good
cause is needed to effectuate the goals of ICWA, which fails to provide
specific guidance to determine good cause. As a result, state courts may
dutifully acknowledge the preferences, then nonetheless apply a
discretionary analysis often rooted in subjective conclusions to find good
cause for nonpreferential placement. 29 Uniform implementation of the
structure delineated in the BIA Guidelines could effectively cabin state
court discretion and eliminate current practices that misapply mainstream
values to Indian child welfare determinations.
Thus, Congress should require, by legislative action., that state courts
follow the BIA Guidelines § F.3. If Congress does this, § D.4 of the
guidelines also should be included to clarify the qualifications of an
expert witness who may testify that the child has extraordinary physical
130
or emotional needs warranting nonpreferential placement.
Further, if this amendment to the Act is undertaken, Congress should
consider clarifying the relationship of the statement in § 1915(d) to the
section as a whole. Section 1915(d) requires that state courts adhere to
the prevailing social and cultural standards of the relevant Indian
community in meeting the preference requirements of § 1915.2 The
purpose of § 1915(d) is to limit the states' discretion in placement
Welfare Act" and thus are applicable); see also Quinn v. Walters, 881 P.2d 795, 811 (Or. 1994)
(Unis, J., dissenting) (stating that BIA Guidelines should be considered :o further congressional
intent of ICWA as guidelines represent what BIA has determined is required to protect rights granted
by ICWA in state court proceedings).
127. See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text This discretion applies where primary
responsibility for interpreting language such as "good cause" remains with tie courts pursuant to the
Act. The adequacy of the state court procedures in protecting the rights guaranteed by the Act (which
differs from that recommended in the guidelines) will have to be judged on their own merits.
129. See discussionsuprapart IV.A.
130. See discussion of BIA Guidelines suprapart I.A.
131. See supranotes 31-32 and accompanying text
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decisions132 and technically should apply in corresponding fashion to the
"good cause" determination.13 Congress could clarify this by simply
inserting the phrase "and in determining good cause to the contrary" into
§ 1915(d).134 Mandatory application of the guidelines would clarify the
statutory language and ensure that good cause determinations are
consistent with ICWA's intent.
A statement by the U.S. Supreme Court, similar to the Holyfield edict
defining the application of domicile pursuant to the Act,135 would further
clarify the appropriate exercise of the good cause exception in § 1915.
State courts would be obligated to follow the Court's construction.
However, given that the Court recently denied certiorari in Campbell,3 '
such an explicit directive is not likely to appear in the near future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Using the BIA Guidelines to determine good cause pursuant to 25
U.S.C. § 1915 will assure the proper application of ICWA. The Act's
failure to provide a definition of good cause leaves a gap that the
guidelines can fill to secure protection of the rights guaranteed by ICWA.
ICWA presumes that the best interests of an Indian child will be served
by placement within the statutory preferences. A court's finding of good
cause for nonpreferential placement should be limited to the factors
delineated in the guidelines to adequately protect "the rights of the Indian
child as an Indian and the rights of the Indian community and tribe in
retaining its children in its society."' 3 Congressionally regulated
adherence to the BIA Guidelines can effectively limit discretion that
often is predicated on mainstream standards and will ensure that the

132. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
133. The Campbell court was cognizant of this implication in reaching its decision that as
permanence may be defined differently in Native American cultures, it did not constitute a good
cause exception based upon extraordinary emotional needs. See supra note 112 and accompanying

text.
134. The amended statement as a whole would read:
The standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of this section and in
determining good cause to the contrary shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of
the Indian community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which the parent or
extended family members maintain social and cultural ties.
135. See discussion suprapart III.
136. An appeal from the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Campbell was denied
certiorari on January 23, 1995. See discussion suprapart IV.B.2.
137. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, supra note 16, at 23, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7546.
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statutory intent of ICWA is properly complied with by each state court
charged with determining the future of an Indian child.
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